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December 1965] Recent Developments 
Purely Economic Justifications Sufficient To Perm.it 
Exercise of Federal Eminent Domain Power-
United States v. Certain Parcels of Land* 
347 
The federal government, pursuant to authorizing statutes,1 sought 
to condemn defendant's land, alleging that it was needed as a source 
of fill for a section of the National System of Interstate and Defense 
Highways. Defendant offered proof demonstrating that commercial 
fill could easily be purchased within the immediate area,2 that it was 
therefore not necessary for the government to condemn any land in 
order to complete the construction of the highway, and that his land 
was zoned "light industrial" and was thus ideally suited for future 
development. Employing the usual stringent proof requirements, the 
court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, on 
the ground that purely economic considerations will justify the 
exercise of the federal eminent domain power.3 
When the federal courts review a taking of property under the 
eminent domain power,4 they are confronted with two questions: 
whether the taking was for a public use, 5 and whether it was neces-
• 233 F. Supp. 544 rN .D. Mich. 1964). 
1. 46 Stat. 1421-22 (1931), 23 U.S.C. § 107, 40 U.S.C. §§ 258(a)-258(e) (1964); 25 
Stat. 357 (1888), 40 U.S.C. § 257 (1964). Under § 107, the Secretary of Commerce is 
authorized "for ••• purposes in connection with the prosecution of any project for 
the construction • • • of any section of the Interstate System . . . to acquire . • • 
interests in lands by ••• condemnation." Section 257 permits the designated officer 
to acquire the land "whenever in his opinion it is necessary or advantageous to the 
Government to do so." This section has been interpreted as enabling legislation 
which can be utilized only when other congressional authorization has been pro• 
claimed. Bamidge v. United States, 101 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1939); United States v. 
Threlkeld, 72 F.2d 464 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 620 (1934). 
2. In order to reach defendant's land, which was located approximately one mile 
from the construction site, the government was required to condemn an easement over 
the land situated between the highway and defendant's property. A commercial sand 
and gravel pit was situated about 700 feet past defendant's land. Interview with defense 
counsel in Lansing, Michigan, February 12, 1965. If the land were contignous to the 
highway, then it is undisputed that the government would be able to enter it in order 
to condemn materials required for highway construction. See 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT 
DOMAIN § 7.5121 (3d ed. 1950); cf. Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 1322 (1957). 
3. United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 233 F. Supp. 544 rn.D. Mich. 1964) 
(hereinafter cited as principal case). 
4. The power of eminent domain is generally considered to be inherent in the 
sovereign, rather than a right created by the fifth amendment or an implied power of 
the government. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896); Kohl v. 
United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875). Although the power is inherent, it may not be 
exercised until Congress has passed appropriate legislation. Chappell v. United States, 
160 U.S. 499 (1896). It has been contended that the fifth amendment precludes an 
exercise of the power unless there is physical use of the property by the public. LEw1s, 
EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 257-58 (3d ed. 1909). This so-called "narrow view" has been 
rejected by modem courts. See 2 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 7.2-7.224. 
5. The scope of the public-use requirement has been substantially broadened in the 
past ten years. In :Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for 
a unanimous Court, in effect equated "public use" with "public purpose." Having 
found that the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act was a constitutional exercise 
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sary in order to effectuate that public use.6 Once the courts are 
satisfied that the public-use requirement has been met, they in-
variably approve the proposed condemnation, reasoning that the 
administrative determination of necessity is conclusive upon them 
absent an arbitrary, capricious, or bad faith exercise of administra-
tive judgment. 7 A few federal courts appear to treat the administra-
tive determination of necessity as controlling under any circum-
stances, 8 but even these courts often impliedly recognize the 
limitations expressly enunciated in the majority holdings.0 In any 
event, there exists a marked reluctance on the part of the federal 
judiciary to overturn an administrative finding of necessity.10 This 
of the police power because it was for a valid public purpose, he concluded that the 
power of eminent domain was a legitimate means of effectuating the ends of the police 
power. Id. at 33. Even before Berman, however, the Court had accorded Congress sub-
stantial latitude within the bounds of the public use requirement. In Old Dominion 
Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925), Mr. Justice Holmes stated that the 
congressional declaration was "entitled to deference until it [was] shown to involve an 
impossibility." In addition, the public benefit need be only remotely important; private 
individuals may be the primary beneficiaries of the taking. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 
(1905). 
6. See, e.g., Puget Sound Power&: Light Co. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 123 F,2d 286 
(9th Cir. 1941). 
7. See, e.g., United States v. Threlkeld, 72 F.2d 464 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 
620 (1934). If Congress directly exercises the eminent domain power, then the deter• 
mination is conclusive because the courts would be unable to inquire into congressional 
motives under the doctrine of separation of powers. Lavine, Extent of Judicial Inquiry 
Into Power of Eminent Domain, 28 So. CAL. L. R.Ev. 369, 378 (1955). References to 
political considerations of comity are also present in cases involving administrative 
decisions. United States v. 40.75 Acres of Land, 76 F. Supp. 239 (N.D. Ill. 1948). In this 
excellent opinion, after an extensive review of the federal condemnation cases involving 
the question of arbitrary and capricious conduct on the part of administrative officials, 
the court concluded that it was difficult to ascertain what burden of proof stare decisis 
placed upon the landowner. Therefore, by analogy to the law of torts, the court sug• 
gested that an actual malevolent purpose would have to be demonstrated by the land• 
owner in order to set aside the taking. 
8. See generally Marquis, Constitutional and Statutory Authority To Condemn, 43 
IowA L. REv. 170 (1958). 
9. See, e.g., United States v. 1096.84 Acres, 99 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Ark. 1951). Without 
such a limitation, it would seem that "the power ••• in the hands of thoughtless and 
over-avaricious officials could be used for improper and coercive methods." United 
States v. 6576.27 Acres of Land, 77 F. Supp. 244 (D.N.D. 1948). However, once the 
courts find that there is a necessity for a taking, then the amount and the estate to be 
taken are solely within the discretion of the administrative agency. Shoemaker v. United 
States, 147 U.S. 282, 298 (1893); Simmonds v. United States, 199 F.2d 805, 806-07 (9th 
Cir. 1952). 
IO. Because of the judicial deference accorded administrative decisions, there is 
apparently not one instance in which the federal courts have not ultimately decreed 
that the taking by the government was necessary in effectuating the public use. Sec 
United States ex rel. T.V .A. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 557 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring); 1964 DUKE L.J. 123, 131. Instances where the lower courts have found the 
taking to be arbitrary and capricious have been uniformly reversed by the appellate 
courts. See, e.g., United States v. 209.25 Acres of Land, 108 F. Supp. 454 (W.D. Ark. 1952), 
rev'd sub nom. United States v. Willis, 211 F.2d I (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 847 U.S. 1015 
(1954); United States v. Certain Land, 55 F. Supp. 555 (D. Mo. 1944), aff'd sub nom, 
United States v. Carmack, 151 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1945), rev'd, 329 U.S. 230 (1946). Many 
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reluctance is apparently attributable to the courts' recognition that 
two related factors are predominant in the typical condemnation pro-
ceeding. First, someone's land must be condemned so that the pro-
posed project may be undertaken. For example, when the federal 
go;vernment contemplates the construction of a dam, it may consider 
several locations in order to ascertain which site would best satisfy 
its goal of flood control or electric power supply. Once the decision 
as to location is made, however, the particular lands upon which the 
dam will be constructed and over which the backflow will pass roust 
necessarily be acquired before other steps may be taken. Second, the 
government generally exercises its power of eminent domain in pro-
jects of immense scope and complexity, such as urban renewal or 
highway construction, in which administrative expertise plays a 
dominant role in site selection, and over which the judiciary is 
generally poorly prepared to pass judgment.11 
This appreciation of the difficulties inherent in their review of 
condemnation proceedings has led the federal courts to impose a 
heavy burden of proof upon the landowner in order to demonstrate 
that the taking was not necessary: the landowner is required to prove 
the subjective malfeasance of the responsible government official.12 
Furthermore, since the relevant statute generally requires that the 
administrative edict be handed down by the head of the admini-
strative agency involved~ 13 the official whose malfeasance must be 
of the modern condemnation cases were brought by the Secretary of War during the 
Second World War. At that time the courts were understandably hesitant to impede 
the war effort, and therefore avoided second-guessing the intricate military decisions 
which required expeditious condemnation. See, e.g., United States v. 243.22 Acres of 
Land, 129 F.2d 678, 683 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J.): "The decision of the Secretary of War 
is not open to judicial inquiry. That is fortunate, for if it were open, the ensuing delay 
would delight our country's enemies." 
11. "In passing upon the authority of the 'r.V.A. we would do violence to fact were 
we to break one inseparable transaction into separate units. We view the entire trans-
action as a single integrated effort on the part of T.V.A. to carry on its congressionally 
authorized functions." United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552-53 
(1946) (land cut off by inundation of highway condemned by T.V.A. and given to 
National Park Service in lieu of more expensive construction of new highway to isolated 
land); United States v. 40.75 Acres of Land, 76 F. Supp. 239 (N.D. Ill. 1948) (choice of 
site is an engineering decision rather than a judicial one); cf. United States v. 
Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386, 392 (1945). See Lavine, supra note 7, at 376. 
12. See United States v. Meyer, 113 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1940). A mere assertion that 
the official acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith is not sufficient to transmute 
what was a legislative question into a judicial one. United States v. Mischke, 285 F.2d 
628 (8th Cir. 1961). The presumption that the government official acted validly is given 
great weight by the courts. United States v. 1096.84 Acres, 99 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Ark. 
1951). Because the question is one of bad faith, not bad judgment, the landowner must 
charge facts which suggest actual malevolence by the officer to the complaining party. 
United States v. Southerly Portion of Bodie Island, 114 F. Supp. 427, 430 (E.D.N.C. 
1953); cf. Mississippi Power&: Light Co. v. Blake, 236 Miss. 207, 221, 109 So. 2d 657, 662 
(1959). See note 7 supra. 
13. For example, under the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways Act, 
which was involved in the principal case, the Secretary of Commerce is the only official 
who can exercise the condemnation power. 46 Stat. 1421-22 (1931), 23 U.S.C. § 107 (1964). 
350 Michigan Law Review [Vol.64 
proved is almost invariably of high rank and will probably have had 
little, if any, contact with the actual decision-making process. 
The court in the principal case does not appear to have realized 
that the two predominant factors which have caused the federal 
courts to refrain from an extensive review of the administrat\Ve 
determination of necessity in the typical condemnation case-neces-
sity and administrative expertise-were not present in the proceed-
ings before it.14 As the defendant contended, it was not essential for 
the government to condemn any land at all in order to procure the 
fill dirt needed for the construction of the highway, since it could 
easily have purchased fill dirt from a nearby commercial sand and 
gravel contractor.15 Moreover, because the government's decision to 
condemn defendant's land was based upon an elementary decision 
to conserve money, the factor of administrative expertise was simi-
larly lacking.16 
Since these same factors form the basis for the rigorous burden of 
proof usually placed on the landowner, their absence in the principal 
case suggests that the utilization of a more relaxed standard, perhaps 
a balancing-of-interests test, would have been more appropriate.17 
Under such a standard the landmvner would be required to demon-
strate both that the government's taking was exclusively for economic 
reasons18 and that his interest in retaining the property sufficiently 
14. Since the construction of highways has long been a classic example of an essen-
tial governmental activity, there seems no doubt that the court was correct in its 
determination that the public-use requirement was met. See Helstad, Recent Trends in 
Highway Condemnation Law, 1964 WASH. U.L.Q. 58. The construction of limited 
access highways has created similar problems, for in some instances a landowner's 
property will be "landlocked" when the highway slices his land in two. In such cases, the 
courts have generally found that the right of way for an access road is a by-product 
of the highway construction, which is admittedly for a public purpose. Luke v. Massa-
chusetts Turnpike Authority, 337 Mass. 304, 149 N.E.2d 225 (1958). Contra, Libbe v. 
Imhoff, 11 Ill. App. 2d 344, 137 N.E.2d 85 (1956). 
15. In the principal case the court relied heavily upon Harwell v. United States, 316 
F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1963), in which a tract of land was condemned for a source of 
stone in the construction of a dam and reservoir. Although the court in the principal 
case admitted that the precise question of whether a purely economic motive would 
suffice to sustain a taking was not directly confronted by the Harwell court, it felt that 
such economic considerations underlay the decision and led to the "inescapable result 
..• that the [government's] motion for summary judgment must be granted." Principal 
case at 546. It seems that the court may have overlooked what could be a crucial dis-
tinction between the fact situations presented in Harwell and in the principal case: that 
the stone required for the construction in Harwell may not have been available in the 
open market and that the government may have been forced, as a result, to condemn 
a tract of land in order to secure the necessary materials. · 
16. In other instances involving relatively uncomplicated administrative decisions, 
such as the determination by an administrative agency that certain matter is unmailable 
because it is fraudulent or obscene, the courts have been willing to review the ad-
ministrative action. See Jeffries v. Olesen, 121 F. Supp. 463 (S.D. Cal. 1954). See Lavine, 
supra note 7, at 378. 
17. See Note, Public Use as a Limitation on Eminent Domain in Urban Renewal, 68 
HARV. L. REv. 1422 (1955); 40 IOWA L. REV. 659 (1955). 
18. If the government's decision to condemn were based upon other factors, such as 
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outweighed the amount which the government would save by con-
demning his land.19 
It has been contended that the interest of the property holder is 
sufficiently protected under the stric,ter standard employed in the 
principal case because the fifth amendment requires that just com-
pensation be paid.20 However, in certain instances the compensation 
offered by the government is at least partially inadequate because for 
practical reasons of valuation certain intangible interests emanating 
from the ownership of property are necessarily excluded from the 
award of damages.21 The federal courts have generally subordinated · 
these considerations in the typical condemnation proceeding in 
order to facilitate the effectuation of massive public programs.22 
State courts, however, have been somewhat more responsive to 
such considerations,23 perhaps in part because of the reduced com-
plexity of the programs which state and local governments attempt 
to implement. When reviewing a taking by a municipality or a 
local school board, for example, state courts have apparently equated 
their expertise with that of the agency, and have consequently 
scrutinized the necessity of the taking more carefully.24 When con-
distances which would have to be traveled in order to secure the fill commercially or 
the reliability of the commercial operators in the surrounding area, it could be 
plausibly argued that the degree of administrative expertise involved in such decisions 
was sufficient to preclude extensive judicial inquiry. 
The government in the principal case relied exclusively on cost justifications. Fill 
obtained by condemning the defendant's land would cost three or four cents per yard, 
while the current market price was at least twenty cents per yard. Because the govern-
ment needed approximately 1,200,000 yards of borrow, the saving would probably 
have been several hundred thousand dollars. Interview with defense counsel in 
Lansing, Michigan, February 12, 1965. 
19. It should be noted that this standard is similar to the substantive due process 
test enunciated in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). 
20. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954); Marquis, supra note 8, at 185. 
But see 40 IOWA L. REv. 659, 662 (1955). See also Searles &: Rapheael, Current Trends 
in the Law of Condemnation, 27 FORDHAM L. REv. 529 (1959). 
21. Common examples of the types of interests which the courts have held to be 
non-compensable are the value of a business over and above the value of the land 
being taken-future profits, cost of preventing loss of trade, and moving costs. See 
Cromwell, Some Elements of Damage in Condemnation, 43 IowA L. REv. 191 (1958); 
Crouch, Valuation Problems Under Eminent Domain, 1959 Wis. L. REv. 608. These costs 
are sometimes extensive, particularly when a business bas been well established in a loca-
tion for a number of years. See generally 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN 
§§ 72-76 (2d ed. 1953). In the principal case, any plans which the defendant may have 
had for future industrial development of his land would be non-compensable since such 
damages would be considered too remote. 
22. See, e.g., Arp v. United States, 244 F.2d 571 (10th Cir. 1957); United States v. 
40.75 Acres of Land, 76 F. Supp. 239, 246 (N.D. Ill. 1948). But see District of Columbia 
Redev. Land Agency v. 70 Parcels of Land, 153 F. Supp. 840 (D.D.C. 1954) (discussion 
of other devices employed to protect property owner's interest). 
23. See United States v. 3.65 Acres of Land, 53 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Mo. 1944). 
But see Weiss, Is the Power of Eminent Domain Dangerous Under the Urban Renewal 
Act1, 57 DICK. L. REv. 326 (1953). 
24. Winger v. Aires, 371 Pa. 242, 89 A.2d 521 (1952) (condemnation by school board 
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demnation is not actually necessary in order to satisfy the govern-
ment's needs, it would. seem that the presence of these non-com-
pensable losses should assume even greater importance. 
If the government can condemn land for solely economic reasons, 
the use of the eminent domain power can be vastly expanded as long 
as the public-use requirement is met and just compensation paid. 
Logically, under the holding in the principal case the government 
could condemn a private forest to obtain lumber, or a private pond 
to obtain water, or a private beach to obtain sand for concrete. 
Although it is extremely doubtful that the courts would allow such 
an expansion of the power, its theoretical possibility should warn 
the judiciary that a taking based solely upon economic necessity is 
qualitatively different from the taking in the typical condemnation 
case and that this difference suggests that separate standards should 
be employed in their review. 
held to constitute an abuse of discretion); Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 1322 (1957) (cemeteries). 
In a few states, the legislatures have established quasi-judicial procedures for deter-
mining the necessity of particular highway takings. See Helstad, supra note 14, at 61. In 
a minority of jurisdictions, the courts will hold a de novo hearing if the taking by an 
urban renewal agency is merely alleged to be arbitrary and capricious. See Offen v. City 
of Topeka, 186 Kan. 389, 350 P.2d 33 (1960); Bristol Redev. &: Housing Authority v. 
Denton, 198 Va. 171, 93 S.E.2d 288 (1956). On the other hand, most courts will allow 
review only if the decision appears baseless and irrational. Kaskel v. Impelliterri, !106 
N.Y. 73, 115 N.E.2d 659 (195!1), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 934 (1954). Apparently only one 
court has ruled that the determination of the agency is conclusively controlling, Allen 
v. City Council, 215 Ga. 778, 113 S.E.2d 621 (1960), and that holding has been severely 
criticized. See Weinstein, Judicial Review in Urban Renewal, 21 FED. B.J. 318, 329 
(1961); 74 HARV. L. REv. 799 (1961). See generally Note, State Constitutional Limitations 
on the Power of Eminent Domain, 77 HARv. L. REv. 717 (1964). 
There also seems to be a tendency for the courts to scrutinize more closely tlie 
takings of private corporations. It has been suggested that this distinction is based upon 
the aura of official dignity which surrounds takings by governmental agencies. Lavine, 
supra note 7, at 380. 
